

Ryan Cox | Curriculum Vitae

Department of Philosophy
School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry
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Areas of Specialisation

- Philosophy of Mind and Action, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Language.

Areas of Competence

- Metaphysics, Ethics, Logic, and Metaethics.

Current Position

- 2017–Present. Honorary Associate, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney.

Previous Positions

- 2016–2017. Visiting Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Hamburg.
 - Project Title: *The Language of Explanation*.
 - Funding: German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD).

Education

- 2011–2017 (Received, March 2017): PhD. Philosophy, The Australian National University.
 - Thesis: *Knowing Why: Essays on Self-Knowledge and Rational Explanation*.
 - Supervisors: Daniel Stoljar (chair), David Chalmers, Daniel Nolan, Nicholas Southwood.
- 2013–2014 (6 months): Guest of the Faculty of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, Cambridge University.
 - Mentor: Dr. John Maier
- 2012–2012 (6 months): Visiting Student Research Collaborator, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University.
 - Supervisor: Professor Michael Smith
- 2009–2011 M.A. Philosophy, The University of Western Australia.
 - Thesis: *The Authority of Practical Knowledge*
 - Supervisor: Nicholas Damnjanovic
 - Examiners: Kieran Setiya and Kevin Falvey
- 2005–2009 B.A. Philosophy (Honours), The University of Western Australia.
 - Dissertation: *Democracy and Education: The Revised Democratic Threshold Principle*
 - Supervisor: Michael Levine

Publications

- Journal Articles
 - Cox, R. (forthcoming) “Knowing Why” *Mind & Language*. Final draft available from http://www.rdouglascox.com/publications/knowing_why.pdf

- Book Reviews
 - Cox, R. (2017) “Review of T. Parent *Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind: An Essay in Neo-Sellarsian Philosophy*” *Notre Dame Philosophical Review*.

Awards

- 2011 ANU Vice Chancellor’s Scholarship
 - Awarded annually on the basis of academic merit to the top student applicant for an Australian Postgraduate Award in the College of Arts and Social Sciences. Covers tuition, living expenses, and travel. Held for the duration of candidature.
- 2009 Theresa Symons Postgraduate Scholarship in Philosophy
 - Awarded annually on the basis of academic achievement. Contributes to living expenses.
- 2009 Julius Kovesi Memorial Prize
 - Awarded annually to the student who has the highest mark for honours in philosophy. Cash prize.
- 2008 Jean Rogerson Honours Studentship
 - Awarded on the basis of academic achievement. Awarded annually. Cash prize.
- 2008 S. A. Grave Prize in Philosophy
 - Awarded to the student who has shown the most outstanding ability in Level 3 philosophy units. Awarded annually. Cash prize.

Presentations

- 2017 Current Projects Seminar (Sydney University)
 - Self-Knowledge and Made Up Minds
- 2017 Awesome Moral Philosophy Workshop (Australian National University, Invited)
 - Knowledge of Moral Incapacities
- 2017 PhilSoc (University of Western Australia)
 - Knowledge of Moral Incapacities
- 2017 Normative Capacities Workshop (Utrecht University, Invited)
 - Knowledge of Moral Incapacities
- 2017 Forschungskolloquium: Sprache & Welt (University of Hamburg)
 - How Why Interrogatives Work
- 2016 Forschungskolloquium: Praktische Philosophie (University of Hamburg)
 - Actions, Reasons, and Because
- 2016 Forschungskolloquium: Sprache & Welt (University of Hamburg)
 - Hyperintensional Context in Explanatory Language
- 2016 ANU PhilSoc Seminar (ANU Canberra)
 - Knowing Why
- 2016 Current Projects Seminar (Sydney University)
 - Knowing Why
- 2015 OZSW Conference (VU Amsterdam)
 - Excusing Facts.
- 2015 Sixth Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy, SOPhiA (University of Salzburg)
 - Hyperintensional Contexts in Explanatory Language
- 2015 Responsibility—The Epistemic Dimension II (VU Amsterdam)
 - Moral Know How: Comments on Errol Lord’s “On the Intellectual Conditions for

Responsibility”

- 2014 ANU PhilSoc Seminar (ANU Canberra)
 - Because and Why in Context
- 2014 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference (ANU Canberra)
 - Knowing What and Knowing Why
- 2013 ANU PhilSoc Seminar (ANU Canberra)
 - Epistemic Conditions on Acting for a Reason
- 2013 Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference (UQ Brisbane)
 - Self-Knowledge and the Concept of a Person
- 2012 ANU PhilSoc Seminar (ANU Canberra)
 - Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency
- 2012 ANU Graduate Conference, Kioloa (ANU Kioloa)
 - Getting Clear on Transparency
- 2011 ANU Graduate Conference, Kioloa (ANU Kioloa)
 - Promotion for Humeans

ANU Coursework Units

- 2013 Modals in Language
 - Instructor: Paolo Santorio
- 2012 Conditionals
 - Instructors: Rachael Briggs and Alan Hajek
- 2012 Explanation
 - Instructor: Zoe Drayson
- 2012 Decision Theory
 - Instructor: Wolfgang Schwarz
- 2012 Modal Logic
 - Instructor: Raul Saucedo
- 2011 Contextualism and Relativism
 - Jonathan Schaffer

Teaching

- Tutor / Teaching Assistant (University of Sydney)
 - 2017 Sem 2 Introductory Logic.
- Tutor / Teaching Assistant (University of Western Australia)
 - 2011 Sem 1 Introduction to Critical Thinking.
 - 2010 Sem 2 Key Topics in Philosophy.
 - 2010 Sem 1 Introduction to Critical Thinking.
 - 2009 Sem 2 Key Topics in Philosophy.
 - 2009 Sem 1 Introduction to Critical Thinking.
- Tutor / Teaching Assistant (University of Notre Dame, Fremantle)
 - 2011 Sem 1 Introduction to Philosophy. (93.9% Satisfied Overall)
 - 2011 Sem 1 Introduction to Ethics. (89.3% Satisfied Overall)
 - 2010 Sem 1 Introduction to Philosophy. (82.8% Satisfied Overall)
 - 2009 Sem 2 Introduction to Philosophy. (83.9% Satisfied Overall)
- Guest Lecturer (University of Western Australia)
 - 2010 Key Topics in Philosophy Two lectures on personal identity.
 - 2008 Topics in Philosophical Psychology One lecture on the nature of love.

Service

- 2017 Reviewing: Journal of Philosophical Research (x1), Philosophical Studies (x1)
- 2016 Reviewing: Journal of Applied Philosophy (x1).
- 2015 Reviewing: Dialectica (x1).
- 2012 Head Organiser: ANU Kioloa Graduate Student Conference.
- 2010 Facilitator: Hale School Philosophthon.

Thesis Abstract

My PhD thesis “Knowing Why: Essays on Self-Knowledge and Rational Explanation” is about basic self-knowledge, our knowledge of particular facts about our own actions, attitudes, and other mental states. It focuses on our knowledge of particular explanatory facts about our own actions and attitudes. It defends a particular interrogative theory of such knowledge, according to which our knowledge of such facts about our own actions and attitudes is arrived at by resolving related deliberative questions about our own actions and attitudes.

The third chapter of my thesis is forthcoming as “Knowing Why” in *Mind & Language*. The fourth chapter has now been superseded by “Self-Knowledge and Made Up Minds” and “Self-Knowledge and Contamination”. The first chapter has now been superseded by “Self-Knowledge and Inference” and “Self-Knowledge and Reasons”. The second chapter has now been superseded by “Actions, Reasons, and Because”

Work Under Review and In Progress

- “Self-Knowledge and Made Up Minds” (under review)
 - Defends the deliberative theory of self-knowledge against the made up minds objection.
- “Self-Knowledge and Contamination” (under review)
 - Defends the deliberative theory of self-knowledge against the contamination objection.
- “Knowledge of Moral Incapacities” (under review)
 - Defends the deliberative theory of moral incapacities and the deliberative theory of knowledge of moral incapacities.
- “Self-Knowledge and Inference”
 - Argues against the view that self-knowledge is a kind of inferential knowledge.
- “Self-Knowledge and Special Inferentialism”
 - Argues against the kind of special inferential about self-knowledge defended by Alex Byrne.
- “Self-Knowledge and Reasons”
 - Argues against the view that particular propositions about our own mental states are reasons we have for believing those very propositions.
- “Actions, Reasons, and Because”
 - Offers a syntax and semantics of ‘because’-sentences which supports the orthodox view of reason explanations.
- “Adverbs of Intention”
 - Argues that adverbs of volition, like ‘intentionally’ are one place predicates of events, although highly context sensitive predicates at that.
- “Instrumental Desires and Introspective Beliefs”
 - Compares arguments for constitutive theories of instrumental desires and introspec-

- tive beliefs and argues that they do not succeed in establishing these theories.
- “How Why-Questions Work”
 - Offers a syntax and semantics of ‘why’-questions which is better suited to what we use ‘why’-questions to do than alternative contrastive accounts of ‘why’-questions.
 - “Is ‘Because’ a Sentential Connective?”
 - Argues that “Because” probably isn’t a sentential connective, as standardly conceived.
 - “Hyperintensional Contexts in Explanatory Language”
 - Attempts to accommodate purportedly hyperintensional contexts in explanatory language within an extensional, event-based, semantics.

References

- Daniel Stoljar, Australian National University, School of Philosophy. (PhD Supervisor).
 - e-mail: daniel.stoljar@anu.edu.au
- David Chalmers, New York University; Australian National University.
 - e-mail: chalmers@nyu.edu
- Daniel Nolan, Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame.
 - e-mail: dnolan@nd.edu
- Benjamin Schnieder, University of Hamburg, Department of Philosophy.
 - e-mail: phrv001@uni-hamburg.de
- Georgiana Kirkham, University of Western Australia. (Teaching reference).
 - e-mail nin.kirkham@uwa.edu.au